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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Kevin Scott Dias appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction entered 
pursuant to a conditional guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence.  In the district court, Mr. Dias asserted that, following a traffic stop, the search 
of his car exceeded the scope of his consent when the officer asked to “just take a quick 
look” in his car but then opened and searched his fanny pack, which was in the back 
seat.  The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Mr. Dias entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to deliver, which preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  Mr. Dias asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion to 
suppress, as the warrantless search violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 18, 2014, Mr. Dias was stopped by Boise Police Officer Miller for failing 
to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.  (Tr. 9/3/14, p.2, L.18 – p.3, L.24.)1  Officer 
Miller said that because Mr. Dias seemed nervous, he asked him to get out of his car.  
(Tr. 9/3/14, p.8, Ls.4-10.)  He then asked if he could search Mr. Dias, and Mr. Dias 
consented.  (Tr. 9/3/14, p.8, Ls.11-15.)  After finding no contraband on his person, 
Officer Miller told Mr. Dias to go back with him to his police car and take a seat on the 
                                            
1 For purposes of the suppression motion, the parties stipulated to the facts as 
presented at the preliminary hearing.  (Tr. 3/27/15, p.5, L.11 – p.6, L.9.)   
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bumper.  (State’s Exhibit 2 (Audio recording of the traffic stop (hereinafter, Audio)) at 
13:10 – 13:20.)  Officer Miller testified that he then continued to question Mr. Dias about 
why he was nervous, and Mr. Dias told him that he had not had good interactions with 
the police in the past.  (Tr. 9/3/14, p.9, Ls.6-13.)   
Officer Miller then asked Mr. Dias if he had anything illegal in the vehicle and 
asked if he could “just take a quick look” to see if there was anything in the car.  
(Tr. 9/3/14, p.18, Ls.1-5.)  Specifically, Officer Miller said, “Is there anything in that car I 
need to be aware of tonight man, no weed or nothing like that?  Anything illegal?  Is it 
okay if I just take a quick look at it?  Look inside?  Is that cool?”  (Audio at 13:35 – 
13:45.)  Mr. Dias said “Yeah.”  (Audio at 13:40 – 13:45.)  Once he had Mr. Dias’s 
consent to “just take a quick look,” Officer Miller searched the car and opened a fanny 
pack located behind the driver’s seat.  (Tr. 9/3/14, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.16)  While 
searching through the contents of the fanny pack, Officer Miller found 
methamphetamine, spice, oxycodone, and drug paraphernalia.  (Tr. 9/3/14, p.10, L.18 – 
p.11, L.13.) 
Mr. Dias was initially charged with three counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver and one misdemeanor charge of possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.45-46.)  He filed a motion to suppress the evidence in which he 
argued that Officer Miller’s actions exceeded the scope of his consent because giving 
an officer permission to “just take a quick look” does not “involve a touch, much less an 
opening, of any containers in the vehicle.”  (R., pp.82-84.)  The district court denied the 
motion.  (R., pp.102-10.)  It said, “Based on the context of the interaction between 
Officer Miller and Defendant, a reasonable person would likely have understood that 
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Officer Miller was going to search for ‘weed’ or anything ‘like that’ in the car.”  
(R., p.109.)  It then held that Officer Miller “did not exceed the scope of [Mr. Dias’s] 
consent by searching the fanny pack, because:  (1) a reasonable person would have 
understood from the exchange that Officer Miller intended to search for drugs, and (2) 
[Mr. Dias] did not limit the scope of his consent.”  (R., p.110.)   
Subsequently, Mr. Dias entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and one misdemeanor 
charge.  (R., pp.116, 130; Tr. 4/30/15, p.51, L.19 – p.55, L.25.)  The district court 
imposed a sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction so that 
Mr. Dias could participate in a Rider program.  (R., p.131.)  Mr. Dias filed a Notice of 















Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dias’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 





The district court erred in denying Mr. Dias’s suppression motion because a 
reasonable person would not understand that Mr. Dias’s consent to Officer Miller’s 
request to “just take a quick look” in his car included consent for Officer Miller to search 
the car and its closed containers.  Therefore, the court’s conclusion that the search was 
within the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent was in error.  Furthermore, in this case, Mr. Dias 
could probably not have objected to the scope of the search because Officer Miller told 
Mr. Dias to sit on the front bumper of his police car during the search, so there was 
likely no way for Mr. Dias to see what Officer Miller was doing.  Therefore, Mr. Dias 
could not have known when to object.        
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard.  State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998).  The Court accepts the 
trial court’s determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
“the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  Id.  Thus, the Court 
should review de novo whether the police officer’s actions were permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the 






C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dias’s Motion To Suppress Because 
A Reasonable Person Would Not Understand That Consent To An Officer’s 
Request To “Just Take A Quick Look” In A Car Would Lead To A Full Search Of 
The Car And The Contents Of Its Closed Containers 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 17 (emphasis added).  The purpose of 
this constitutional right is to “impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual’s privacy and 
security against arbitrary invasions.”  State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 
2002).  When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially 
developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against 
the victim of the illegal search and seizure.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) 
(citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914)).  
Searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. 
Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2002).  Consent to search, however, “is one of 
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”  State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 
791, 796 (2003).  The government bears the burden of proving a warrant was not 
necessary.  Id.  And “the burden is on the State to prove . . . that the consent was given 
and that such consent was knowing and voluntary.”  State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615, 
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618 (1972)2 (citing State v. Douglas, 488 P.2d 1366 (Or.1971); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1968)) (Harwood abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130 (1983) as recognized by State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 
447 (Ct. App. 1997)).  Further, “when the basis for a search is consent, the government 
must conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search.”  State v. 
Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Ward, 576 F.2d 
243, 244 (9th Cir. 1978); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977).  
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”  
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 
(1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).  As such, like other consent issues, a 
totality of the circumstances analysis is appropriate.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006).   
In this case, the totality of the circumstances would not lead a reasonable person 
to believe that Mr. Dias consented to a search of the containers in his car.  First, Officer 
Miller did not seek permission to thoroughly search the car’s contents.  Rather, Officer 
Miller simply asked Mr. Dias the following:  “Is it okay if I just take a quick look at it?  
Look inside? Is that cool?”  (Audio at 13:35 – 13:45.)  Mr. Dias said “Yeah.”  (Audio at 
                                            
2 Harwood preceded Shneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  In Bustamonte, 
the United States Supreme Court held that “while the subject's knowledge of a right to 
refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to 
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”  Id. 
at 249.  Bustamonte, however, did not eliminate the requirement that a person must 
know what he is consenting to.  
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13:40 – 13:45.)  The reasonable person observing this exchange would not have 
understood that Mr. Dias’s consent to Officer Miller’s request to “just take a quick look 
at” the inside of the car included consent to a thorough search of the car and the 
contents of its closed containers. 
Secondly, Officer Miller’s questions prior to asking to “just take a quick look” in 
the car were not specific.  They did not indicate that Officer Miller would conduct a 
targeted search for drugs.  Indeed, he asked a series of standard, general questions.  
He asked:  1) if there was anything he needed to be aware of, 2) if there was “weed” or 
anything like that, and 3) if there was “anything illegal” at all in the car.  (Audio at 13:35 
– 13:45.)  These questions would lead a reasonable person to believe that when Officer 
Miller asked to “just take a quick look” in the car, he was not specifically interested in 
searching for drugs or anything else in particular.  Reasonable people are obviously 
aware that officers are always on the lookout for evidence of some crime.  Thus, the 
district court erred when it held that “a reasonable person would have understood from 
the exchange that Officer Miller intended to search for drugs.”  (R., p.110.) 
Further, a “look” is not a “touch.”  The definition of the word “search” is to “look 
through or go over thoroughly to find something.”  The Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary 1306 (Judy Pearsall and Bill Trumble, eds., Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 
1996).  The definition of the word “look” is to “use one’s sight; turn one’s eyes in some 
direction.”  Id. at 846.  The definition of the word “quick” is “taking only a short time.”  Id. 
at 1182.  And finally, used in this context — as an adverb modifying the word “take” — 
the word “just” means “no more than.”  Id. at 768.  Thus, “just take a quick look at” 
means to do no more than use one’s sight for a short time only.  In fact, one of the 
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synonyms for the word “glance” is a “quick look.”  Thesaurus.com, 
http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/glance (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).  Therefore, the 
reasonable person would believe that an officer asking to “just to take a quick look at” 
the inside of a car would only be scanning the interior of the car for whatever is readily 
observable. 
A request to “just take a quick look” is not equivalent to a request to “search,” and 
a holding to that effect in this case would irrationally extend the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Jimeno.  There, the officer specifically overheard Mr. Jimeno 
arranging a drug transaction and later stopped him for a traffic infraction.  Jimeno, 500 
U.S. at 249.  The officer then told Mr. Jimeno that he had reason to believe there were 
drugs in Mr. Jimeno’s car and asked for consent to “search” the car, which Mr. Jimeno 
granted.  Id.  The officer then opened a paper bag located on the floor of the car and 
found contraband.  Id. at 250.  The issue was whether the scope of Mr. Jimeno’s 
consent included a search of the paper bag. 
The Court held, “In this case, the terms of the search’s authorization were simple.  
[Mr. Jimeno] granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any 
explicit limitation on the scope of the search.”  Id. at 251.  The Court found that 
Mr. Jimeno’s consent was a “general consent to search” the car and held that, because 
the officer told Mr. Jimeno that he thought there might be drugs in the car, a “reasonable 
person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a 
container.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court held that consent to “search” the vehicle “extended 
beyond the surfaces of the car’s interior to the paper bag lying on the car’s floor.”  Id. 
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The Jimeno Court found that an unqualified consent to an officer’s request to 
“search” is a general consent.  Id.  And, in that specific situation — where the officer has 
reason to believe there are drugs in the car, and specifically asks about drugs — such a 
general consent to search gave the officer permission to search closed containers.  Id.  
However, some courts have applied the rationale of Jimeno to situations where officers 
do not ask to “search” but instead use another term.  Those courts have held that 
officers, after getting a person’s consent to “look and see” or “look through,” do not 
exceed the scope of that consent when they perform a search and/or open containers, 
so long as the officers indicate that the object of the search is drugs.3  This appears to 
be based in large part on the fact that the Jimeno Court held that reasonable people 
would know that drugs are often kept in containers, and “[t]he scope of a search is 
generally defined by its expressed object.”  Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982)).   
But the Jimeno Court analyzed an officer’s request to “search,” not a request to 
“just take a quick look at” the place to be searched.  And, the request to search in 
Jimeno came after the officer asked specifically about drugs he had a strong reason to 
believe were in fact in the vehicle.  As such, it was clear that the officer was searching 
for drugs.  The Jimeno Court did not hold, however, that as long as an officer mentions 
                                            
3 See, e.g., State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App. 2000) (After asking whether 
there were drugs in the car, officer asked defendant if he would mind if the officer took a 
“look through” the defendant’s truck and then found drugs under the floor mat.); United 
States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 868 (8th Cir. 2010) (Officer asked if defendant 
had drugs in car and then asked “Do you care if I look and see?”  The court held that 
the officer “did not exceed the scope of Vargas–Miranda's consent by reasonably 
searching the car for drugs.”). 
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drugs to the driver in a random traffic stop, the scope of any consent is unlimited, 
regardless of the ambiguity of the officer’s request for consent. 
An officer’s use of terms other than “search” in a request to search increases the 
likelihood that the request is ambiguous, and that any subsequent consent would be 
limited to the words the officer used.  A request to “just take a quick look at” the inside of 
a car does not convey a request to open and explore the contents of closed containers 
found inside the car.4  Thus, when an officer asks to do something other than “search,” 
he does so at his own risk because any consent will be limited to the words the officer 
used.  If the officer does not limit his actions to those words, the consent cannot be 
considered knowing and voluntary.  Here, Officer Miller requested to “just take a quick 
look.”  Therefore, Mr. Dias’s consent was not general.  In other words, the reasonable 
person observing the exchange would believe that consent to Officer Miller’s request 
would lead only a quick look, not a search.  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 
2000), is instructive on this point.  In Wald, after stopping the car for a cracked 
windshield, the officer became suspicious that the men in the car might be using drugs 
and asked, “You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look would you?”  Id. at 1228.  Wald 
consented, and the officer looked in the interior of the car but found nothing.  Id. at 
1225.  He then searched the trunk and noticed that the screws holding the speakers in 
                                            
4 The “quick look issue” has prompted at least one recent law review article: Alexander 
A. Mikhalevsky, The Conversational Consent Search: How “Quick Look” and Other 
Similar Searches Have Eroded Our Constitutional Rights, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1077, 
1086 (2014). 
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place “were marked up.”  Id.  After opening the speakers, he discovered 
methamphetamine.  Id. 
The court held that a “reasonable observer of this exchange would not likely 
conclude that Wald gave [the officer] permission to search the vehicle’s trunk.”  Id. at 
1228.  The same reasoning should apply here.  Since Mr. Dias’s consent was clearly 
limited by the nature of Officer Miller’s request, an observer of the exchange would not 
conclude that the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent extended to containers found in the car 
but rather only to readily observable items in the car.  The questions asked by Officer 
Miller would not communicate that, by consenting, Mr. Dias was giving Officer Miller 
permission to search his personal containers.  Indeed, the district court even went as far 
as to say that it believed Officer Miller “should have been more precise with his 
language by asking Defendant for permission to ‘search’ (nor is it an onerous burden on 
police officers to be more precise when seeking consent for a warrantless search) . . . .”  
(R., p.109.)  Nevertheless, it denied Mr. Dias’s motion to suppress. 
In its denial, the district court noted that there was no Idaho case law specifically 
on point with this case.  (R., p.106.)  Therefore, the court relied on State v. Silva, 134 
Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000) and State v. Jones, No. 36949, 2011 WL 11056704 (Idaho 
Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011) (an unpublished decision),5 to erroneously expand Jimeno to 
include Mr. Dias’s situation.  (R., pp.105-06.)  However, Mr. Dias’s situation is 
distinguishable from those cases. 
In State v. Silva, the defendant filed a motion to suppress and argued that the
                                            
5 The district court also relied on several federal Circuit Court of Appeals opinions.  
(R., pp.107-09.) 
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scope of his consent for the officer to take a “look through” his truck did not give the 
officer permission to then search the cab of the truck and under the floor mats. Id. at 
853.  The Court of Appeals found that “a reasonable and prudent officer would have 
viewed Silva’s consent as permission to search the entire cab, including under the floor 
mats . . . .”  Id. (citing State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 524 n.1 (Ct. App. 1999)).6  This 
case is distinguishable from Silva for two reasons.  First, the officer in Silva requested to 
“look through” the truck, which connotes a more thorough inspection than a request to 
“just take a quick look.”  Second, the officer in Silva did not look in a closed container, 
but under a floor mat. 
The district court also relied on an unpublished Idaho Court of Appeals opinion, 
which held that the Jimeno rationale applied to the search of a home:  State v. Jones, 
No. 36949, 2011 WL 11056704.  (R., p.106.)  In Jones, officers told the defendant that 
they had received a call from someone saying that Mr. Jones was involved in the use or 
sale of drugs, and one officer sought the defendant’s consent to search the home by 
asking if it was okay if he “looked around.”  Id. at *1.  The defendant agreed, and the 
officer looked in a closed container in a closet and found drugs.  Id.  The court held that 
“a typical reasonable person would have believed” that, based on the entire 
conversation, such consent gave law enforcement permission to search the entire 
home, “including anywhere that drugs, the express object of the search, could be 
hidden.”  Id. at *4.   
The facts of Jones are distinguishable from this case.  In Jones, the officer 
specifically said that he had received a call that made him suspicious that Jones was 
                                            
6 The court in Frizzel relied on Jimeno. 
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involved in the use or sale of drugs.  In that respect, the facts of Jones were more like 
those of Jimeno.  Further, Jones did not involve a random traffic stop, as was the case 
here.  In Jones, the officer came to Mr. Jones’s house based on a tip that there were 
drugs in the house.  And, he asked to have a “look around.”  Therefore, the reasonable 
person may have been made aware that the officer would be performing a more 
thorough examination of the premises for drugs.  As such, Silva and Jones do not 
support the denial of Mr. Dias’s motion.  
The district court also erred in holding that, because Mr. Dias “did not limit the 
scope of his consent” by objecting during the search, the search was within the scope of 
his initial consent.  (R., p.110.)  The requirement to object, however, should only apply 
to a situation where the person has given a general consent to search.  Wald 
specifically addressed this issue.  It stated,     
As a general proposition, this court has determined that a defendant’s 
“failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a 
more limited consent[ ] is an indication the search was within the scope of 
consent.” That rule, however, applies only when the defendant initially 
gave “a general authorization to search.” Here, the district court found that 
Wald’s initial consent was not general, but rather was limited to a “quick 
look inside the vehicle,” a finding we affirm as not clearly erroneous. 
 
Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted). 
The same reasoning should apply here.  Once it is clear that a defendant’s 
consent is limited because of the nature of the officer’s request, the defendant should 
not need to further object to the scope of the search.   
Furthermore, the district court did not inquire or make any factual findings with 
respect to whether Mr. Dias could have objected.  He likely could not have in this 
situation because Officer Miller told him to sit on the bumper of the police vehicle, so he 
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almost certainly could not see what Officer Miller was doing in his car and would not 
have known when to object.  (Audio at 13:10 – 13:20.)  As such, the district court erred 
when it held that, because Mr. Dias did not object during the search, Officer Miller did 
not exceed the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dias respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of 
judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 7th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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